Abstract. Aimed at improving the security and efficiency of anonymous authentication in vehicular ad hoc network (VANET), a certificateless batch anonymous authentication scheme without bilinear pairings is put forward. By coordinating Trust Authority (TA) and vehicles to generate the public/private key pairs and pseudonyms, the system security is freed from dependency on tamperproof devices. Through comprehensive analyses, this scheme is proved not only to be able to realize such security properties as authentication, anonymity, traceability, unforgeability, forward or backward security, etc., but also able to resist Type I and Type II attacks in the random oracle model. Moreover, this scheme effectively reduces system storage load by means of certificateless authentication, and the authentication efficiency can also be increased by realizing batch authentication based on pairing-free calculation. Accordingly, the scheme is proved to be significant in theory and valuable in application in the Internet of Things or embedded environment with limited resources.
Introduction
Along with the wide use of vehicles in modern society, a series of transportation problems gradually emerge, like insufficiency of parking lots, traffic congestion, traffic accidents, etc. Consequently, such issues as traffic management, secure driving and traffic information exchange are drawing more and more attention. In managing large numbers of vehicles, Intelligent Transport System (ITS) [1] is widely adopted domestically and abroad. To establish the next-generation transport system, VANET [2] based on Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) [3] is emphasized more and more by enterprises and academia. In VANET, vehicles are able to obtain instant traffic information, weather information and entertainment information by communicating with roadside units (RSUs), which further enhances the enjoyment of driving and brings great convenience to vehicle users.
However, there are various kinds of threats in VANET environment: on the one hand, the data in wireless communications of VANET is easily detected, changed and faked; on the other hand, vehicles being in open physical environments, the leak of privacy (driver's identity, license plate number, position and itinerary) will cause some threats to the lives and properties of both drivers and passengers. Consequently, user's privacy protection [4] is the fundamental demand for secure communications in VANET. Currently, the dominant method of privacy preservation is anonymous authentication [5] , which, nevertheless, is complex in algorithm and relatively heavilyloaded in computation. Besides, the topological structure is caused to vary constantly by the wireless communications in VANET and the highly dynamic vehicles. As a result, the communication efficiency of information interaction in VANET draws more and more attention. Therefore, to improve the security and efficiency of anonymous authentication becomes one of the urgent tasks in VANET research. Aiming at some shortcomings, we proposed a lightweight batch anonymous authentication scheme for VANET. Compared with other schemes, we don't use the bilinear pairing algorithm with high computation complexity. So our scheme effectively reduces the computation cost. What's more, our scheme reduces the storage cost greatly because of certificateless.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we introduce the related work. In Section 3, we introduce the VANET model. The proposed protocol is described in detail in Section 4. In Section 5, we give a theoretical proof of the scheme, such as correctness, anonymity, forward and backward privacy, and under the random oracle model we prove that the scheme can resist Type I and Type II attack, and an efficiency analysis is provided too. The last section concludes the paper.
Related Work
In recent years, researchers have conducted lots of researches on the privacy protection and data security for VANET and have put forward different anonymous authentication schemes. Raya, et al. firstly proposed an anonymous authentication protocol based on alias certificate [6] , in which pseudonyms are adopted as user's true identity to protect user's private data. SPECS [7] introduced a batch verification protocol with enhanced security and privacy, in which a single vehicle could form a group with any other vehicles after batch verification and communicate with each other safely without involving RSU. However, Shi-Jinn, et al. [8] affirmed that SPECS couldn't resist impersonation attack, i.e. the masked vehicle could release false messages and even communicate safely with other legitimate vehicles. In Ref. [8] , for ensuring privacy, each vehicle employs different pseudonyms generated by RSU when sending messages so that it needn't be equipped with large numbers of public/private key pairs, whereas the security of RSU couldn't be guaranteed. To solve this problem, Tzeng proposed an identity-based anonymous authentication scheme [9] , in which each vehicle is equipped with a tamper-proofing device to store system's master key, the vehicle could generate pseudonyms by applying this master key. Nevertheless, recent study [10] shows that the security of Tzeng's scheme depends too much on the tamper-proofing device and attackers can obtain private information via side-channel attacks (like laser scanning and efficiency analysis). As a result, once tamper-proofing device is attacked and the master key is leaked the whole system's security will be threatened. Wang et al. proposed an effective identity privacy protection scheme ECPB [11] based on group signature. All members in the scheme need to be authenticated before they join the group, and also can realize batch authentication.
In the Ref. [12] , an ID-based batch authentication scheme is proposed, where pseudonyms in each message signature process are assumed to be different, and the traceability can be achieved, too. Shao et al. proposed a threshold anonymous authentication protocol based on group signature which can achieve batch certification [13] . Lu et al. proposed a privacy protection scheme SPRING [14] , which uses the constantly changing pseudonyms to protect the privacy of users. With the participation of trusted authority (TA), the efficiency of authentication is improved. 
VANET Model

Fig. 1. VANET Model
Trusted Authority TA. In order to ensure the normally running of the system, TA is required to storing the privacy information for all the authenticated vehicles, generating the overall security parameters and distributing public/private keys to all participants. In general, vehicle manufacturer or transportation management department acts as TA.
Roadside unit RSU. Similar to the access nodes of wireless sensor networks, RSU is the infrastructure installed on both sides of the road, capable of communicating with vehicles via wireless. The RSU communicates with the vehicle using the DSRC protocol [15] , which enables RSU to validate the request information sent by the vehicle.
Vehicle unit OBU. In VANET, each vehicle is equipped with wireless communication module OBU, through which vehicles can communicate with RSU or other vehicles equipped with OBU.
The Proposed Scheme
The scheme proposed in this paper is composed of five phases: initialization phase, secret key generation phase, signature phase, authentication phase and update phase.
Initialization
l is a safety parameter of TA, TA randomly selects prime numbers p and q satisfies s 1 q p  , then randomly selects 
Secret Key Generation
Step1: Let 
and transmits
ID PID B to TA via secure channel.
Step 2: TA receives 
The pseudonym of Vi is 
Let i SK be the secret key,
, and set the public key as
PK PK PK  . The flowchart in public/private-key-generating phase is shown in Fig. 2 : 
Authentication Phase
In this section, the authentication is divided into two parts: single vehicle authentication and batch authentication. 
If it holds, the authentication succeeds; otherwise, the message is rejected.
Batch authentication. Supposing that n different messages are 1 1
According to the sources of the signature message, the batch authentication is divided into three types:
(1) Different messages from the same vehicle, i.e. all the i PID are the same in each certification message. When the RSU or the vehicle receives the batch authentication messages, the RSU or vehicle firstly checks the validity of i t and whether the timestamps i tt are in a valid time interval, then computes:
for each authentication message, and then verifies that
If it holds, it means that these distinct n signatures are valid. For the first type, the n authentication messages are from the same vehicle, all the i PID are the same,
PK and ' i s are respectively the same. So, the authentication formula can be simplified to:
The flowchart in signature authentication phase is shown in Fig. 3 : 
Analysis
Correctness Analysis
This section is to prove the correctness of single authentication and the correctness of batch authentication, as is shown the following.
The correctness of single authentication. During single vehicle authentication, the single vehicle is valid or not according to the formula:
Because:
So, the single vehicle authentication is correct.
The correctness of batch authentication. During batch authentication, the batch vehicles are valid or not by verifying that
Because: Step 2: A selects two different messages: 0 m and 1 m ;
Step 3：Select random bit Step 4: Signer  conducts this signature scheme respectively with B 0 and B 1 ;
Step In the linking game, if the A receives  in Step 5, then it means that A couldn't obtain any useful information, and the probability of obtaining the correct b is 1/2, which is equivalent to the random guess of b . . In this way, challenger is unable to identify from which signer the message is sent, hence this scheme is possessed with unlinkability.
Forward and backward security. Forward security means that even if attacker obtains the currently-authenticated secret information, it will not be able to deduce the information related to the preceding authenticated message. Backward security means that even though attacker obtains the relevant information about authentication, it will not be able to deduce the subsequent authentication information so as to trace the authentication process of vehicles. In this scheme, if attacker obtains the signature message ( , , , )
, where e , so it is impossible for attacker to deduce the preceding or subsequent signature messages by means of current signature messages, thus this scheme satisfies forward and backward security.
Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM attack).
In MITM attack, attacker keeps connected with two parties during communications, and makes them believe that they are communicating and exchanging information under safe circumstances, so as to acquire useful information to attack. In this scheme, a random number will be generated in each communication between RSU and Vi, whereas the random number used by attacker in establishing connection with RSU (or Vi) is different from the random number generated in the communications between RSU and Vi, therefore, attacker is unable to communicate with valid users to implement MITM attack by establishing communications connection with valid users.
Type I attack. Type I attack refers to exterior attacker which is able to replace valid users' public keys. Theorem 2. Under the assumption of Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), the proposed scheme can implement the unforgeability of the adaptive selection message attack in the random oracle model. ; the probability of  continuing normal operation in DLP computation phase is 1 / par q . Therefore, the probability of  winning the game is at least: Comparison of security properties in the proposed scheme with that of other schemes is shown in Table 1 . The proposed scheme can further enhance the security of anonymity authentication for VANET. Let the length of original message be 20 bytes. In scheme [11] , the signature of message is 220 bytes, timestamp is 4 bytes, and ID is 2 bytes. In scheme [12] , original message is 20 bytes, signature is 60 bytes, pseudonym is 40 bytes, timestamp is 4 bytes, and ID space is 4 bytes. In scheme [13] , the original message is 20 bytes., signature space is 826 bytes, timestamp is 4 bytes, and ID space is 3 bytes. In scheme [14] , signature is 40 bytes, certificate is 121 bytes, anonymous secret key is 26 bytes, and ID space is 2 bytes. In scheme [16] , the original message is 20 bytes, signature is 20 bytes, the public key is 20 bytes, anonymous the certificate is 180 bytes. In this proposed scheme, original message is 20 bytes, signature is 60 bytes, and pseudonym is 41 bytes, as is shown in Table 3 : Table 3 . Comparison of communication complexity (unit: bytes) schemes single message authentication Ref. [11] 220 4 2 226   
Ref. [12] 20 60 40 4 4 128     
Ref. [13] 20 826 4 3 853    
Ref. [14] 40 121 26 2 189     
Conclusions
To solve the efficiency problem in anonymity authentication in existing privacy protection schemes for VANET, this paper proposes a certificateless batch anonymity authentication scheme without bilinear pairings operation. Analyses shows that this scheme is not only guaranteed many security properties like anonymity, traceability, unlinkability, forward and backward security, etc. on the basis of correctness. We prove that this scheme can resist Type I and Type II attack under random oracle model. Meanwhile, the public/private keys in this scheme are distributed generated, which effectively avoids the dependence on tamper-resistant device inside vehicle. Furthermore, by adopting certificateless batch authentication without bilinear pairings operation, computation and storage costs are cut down considerably. Therefore, this scheme has much theoretical significance and applied value in the resource-limited Internet of Things or embedded environment. Despite the proposed scheme has made improvement and optimization on the basis of the existing schemes, with the rapid development of vehicle networking technology, it is difficult for anonymous authentication schemes under traditional VANET models to meet the requirements of privacy protection in vehicle anonymous authentication in various communication environments. Therefore, it remains to be tackled for the author to further improve and optimize the proposed scheme so as to satisfy the growing demands of communication of VANET in various conditions. 
